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Case No. 20150841-CA 
IN THE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
JARED MICHAEL WATRING, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a Ruling and Order denying his Motion to 
Correct Illegal Sentence. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2016). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant seeks a sentencing windfall that is directly contrary to 
applicable statutes, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the understanding 
of all participants at the relevant hearings. 
Already on probation for two third degree felony counts of 
possession of a controlled substance and a DUI, Defendant was 
participating in the Regional Substance Abuse Treatment ("RSAT") 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
program mandated as part of his probation. While on probation, he was 
arrested for growing psilocybin mushrooms. 
On February 2, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to a new felony in 
connection with his mushroom arrest and agreed to be sentenced. The 
court imposed an incomplete sentence, without ruling on or even 
mentioning whether his new sentence would run concurrent or consecutive 
with the sentences for his previous convictions. At a probation hearing the 
next day, the court realized Defendant was now disqualified from the RSAT 
program and that his new conviction violated the terms of his ongoing 
probation for his_ prior convictions. Defendant's counsel argued that the 
sentences should all run concurrently, but the court again made no decisi01) 
on that issue. Instead, it indicated that it wanted to review the record and 
set a new sentencing for February 10, 2015. At the continued hearing, 
counsel argued the concurrent/ consecutive issue and the court imposed 
consecutive sentences. A written judgement to that effect was issued two 
days later. 
However, at some point on February 3, 2015, the court signed an 
order of judgment that stated: "All cases and charges 1nay run concurrent." 
Although neither t~1e court nor the parties ever acknowledged or behaved in 
accordance with that order, Defendant now argues that the February 3rd 
-2-
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judgment imposed a com.plete sentence that divested the court of 
jurisdiction to impose consecutive sentences at the February 10th hearing. 
The dish·ict court correctly denied Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence, holding that the February 3rd judgment reciting concurrent 
sentences was a clerical error, that the initial sentence was illegal because it 
was missing a necessary term, and that the February 10th sentencing 
hearing corrected that illegality and hnposed a valid sentence. 
The district court was correct and should be affirmed. 
STATEM.ENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to correct its sentence? 
Standard of Review. Whether a district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Young, 
2014 UT 34, ,rs, 337 P.3d 227. 
2. Did the district court correctly determine that the February 10, 
2015 sentencing corrected its prior illegal sentence? 
Standard of Review. "Sentencing decisions are generally reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,r6, 203 
P.3d 984. However, where the "underlying issue ... is one of statutory 
interpretation" it is reviewed "for correctness, affording no deference to a 
lower court's legal conclusions." Id. Shnilarly, "the interpretation of a rule 
-3-
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of procedure is a question of law ... review[ed] for correch1ess." Braum v. 
Glover, 2000 UT 89, ,r1s, 16 P.3d 540. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401 (West 2015) 
• Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22(e) (correction of illegal sentences) 
• Utah R. Crim. Pro. 30(b) (correction of clerical errors) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 
In Dec~mber_ 2011, Defendant re~eived two suspended zero-to-five-
year prison terms and a suspended jail term of 180 days in connection ,,\Tith 
two third degree felonies and a DUI in case number 1017011211. (Add. B.) 
He was also sentenced to probation and enrolled in the court-supervised 
RSAT program. In December 2014, AP&P searched Defendant's home and 
discovered psilocybin mushrooms and Tramadol, for which Defendant did 
not have a prescription. (R. 2.) This led to the charges in the instant case 
and violated his parole in his prior case. 
Defendant was charged in the instant case, case number 151700133, 
with one count of possession of a conh·olled substance with intent to 
-4-
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distribute, a second degree felony, and possession or use of a controlled 
substance, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 10.) He appeared at his preliminary 
hearing on January 26, 2015 .. (Add. C.) Defendant appeared again on 
February 2, 2015 and pled guilty to an amended count of possession or use 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. (R. 89.) The court 
conducted a plea colloquy, and then sentenced Defendant to a suspended 
term of zero to five years, imposed a one year jail sentence and probation 
that included enrolling in and completing the RSAT program. (R. 88-90.) 
The court added Defendant to the following day's RSAT calendar, but made 
no mention as to whether the new sentence would run concurrent with or 
consecutive to the sentence in the pria.r case. (R. 90.) 
The next. day, February 3, 2015, Defendant appeared on the RSAT 
calendar in connection with bo_th his prior case and the instant case. The 
court acknowledged that (1) Defendant had violated his probation in his 
prior case and would be kicked out cf the RSAT program as a result, (2) he 
was similarly no longer eligible for the RSA T program in the instant case, 
and (3) he was therefore unable to complete his probation in the instant 
case. (R. 93-96.) The court admitted that it had been "confused" the 
previous day, stating that it was "Monday morning after I stayed up too late 
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Sunday night ... I just went on auto pilot, so sorry for the confusion." (R. 
93.) 
At the February 3rd hearing, defense counsel argued that the 
sentences for the two cases should run concurrently. (R. 95.) The court 
again made no ruling on the issue, but _instead said to defense counsel, "if 
you're going to request perhaps I consider something else, can we continue 
this a week so I can pull up the pre-sentence report?" (R. 96.) Defense 
counsel agreed and the court noted it wanted "to know a little bit more" 
and stated twice more that it wanted to review the pre-sentence report. (R. 
97.) The court concluded: "We'll continue the sentencing for one week." (R. 
97.) 
Despite the clear statement of the court's intent to continue 
sentencing and review additional infonnation, on that same day, February 
3, 2015, the court unac~ountably signed an order of judgment in connection 
with the instant case. (Add. E.) The record sheds no light on whether the 
order was signed before or after the February 3rd hearing. The judgment 
imposed the suspended sentence, jail term, and RSAT probation discussed 
at the February 2nd hearing in the instant case. (Add. E at 1.) It also 
included the phrase "all cases and charges may run concurrent." (Add.Eat 
2.) 
-6-
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Despite the February 3rd judgment, the continued sentencing hearing 
on February 10th commenced with the court noting that it was a sentencing 
hearing. (R. 100:5-8.) The parties focused their arguments almost entirely 
on whether the sentences in the two cases should be concurrent or 
consecutive. (R. 100-102.) The court heard from Defendant and then made 
findings on the record, calling Defendant's behavior "a big mistake . . . a 
major mistake," (R. 103:21), and ad1nonishing him for involving another 
participant from the RSAT program in his new crime. (R. 103:22-24.) The 
court then revoked probation in both cases and imposed the three 
suspended sentences from the 2011 conviction (which were to run 
concurrently with each other) and the suspended sentence from the 
February 2, 2015 sentencing in the instant case, ordering it to run 
consecutive to the 2011 sentences. (R. 104; Add. F.) Neither the court nor 
the parties referred to the February 3, 2015 judgment or suggested that the 
court had already ruled on the concurrent/ consecutive sentence question. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
On July 14, 2015, Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence. (R. 35-47.) Although pled only in the barest sense, Defendant 
raised the fundamental question of why the language of the February 3rd 
judgment was not binding and asked how the court was able to impose 
-7-
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consecutive sentences at the February 10th hearing. The Sate did not 
respond to Defendant's motion. Id. ®) 
The court denied the motion on September 15, 2015. (Add. G.) The 
court held that two errors had occurred. The first was that, at the February 
2, 2015 hearing, it "made no order .as to whether Defendant's sentence 
would run concurrent with or consecutive to the sentence Defendant was 
already serving" in connection with the prior case. (Add. G at 2.) The court 
found this" om.ission constituted the imposition of an illegal sentence." Id. 
It held that a second error occurred when the "Court's Clerk 1nistakenly 
included language within the Minute Entry, which states 'All cases and 
charges may run concurrent."' Id. (quoting the February 3rd judgment). 1 
The court found that "[i]t was not the Court's intent to order Defendant's 
1 The record in this case is confusing. In its September 15, 2015 order 
denying the motion to correct illegal sentence, the court refers to the Minute 
Entry as occurring on February 2, 2015 - the date of the hearing - but it was 
signed by the court on February 3, 2015. (See Add. E.) But the February 3rd 
order was docketed on February 4, 2015 and Defendant refers to it in his 
brief as the February 4, 2015 judgment. (See Br.Aplt. at 1.) When the court 
ordered the Minute Entry corrected, a new order was docketed with the 
language regarding concurrent sentences stricken. Al though entered after 
the court's September 15, 2015 order, it is signed as of "February 2, 2015," 
file stamped "Feb-2 2015" and entered into the electronic docket as though 
occurring on February 2, 2015 with a handwritten note reading" Amended" 
on it. (See Add. D.) Because the timing is important to assessing judicial 
inte.nt, the State refers to the judgment,. (Add. E), by the date it was signed 
by the court - February 3, 2015. 
-8-
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sentences to run concurrent and the Court was unaware that the Minute 
Entry included this language when it signed and entered the Minute Entry." 
Id. The court then pointed out that Defense counsel argued for concurrent 
sentences at the February 3rd RSAT hearing, but that the court "continued 
sentencing in the cases to February 10, 2015, so that it could review 
Def~ndant' s Pre-Sentence Investigation report." Id. at 2-3. The court then 
held that the February 10th sentencing was valid and "corrected the illegal 
sentence imposed at the February 2, 2015 hearing." Id. at 3. It further 
ordered that an II Amended Minute Entry" be entered correcting the clerical 
error. 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant seeks a sentencing windfall from an illegal order that was 
followed by a clerical mistake. The only honest reading of the transcripts of 
2 With his brief, Defendant includes the amended judgment as 
Addendum A and describes it as though it was in fact entered on February 
2, 2015. (Br.Aplt. at 5.) This appears to be incorrect. The footer at the 
bottmn of the judgment notes that' the document the court signed was 
printed on September 21, 2015 - after the court denied Defendant's motion. 
(See Add. D.) The court ordered "that the clerical error in the Minute Enh·y 
for Defendant's February 2, 2015 hearing be corrected by the issuance of an 
Amended Minute Entry." (Add. G at 3.) Addendum D to this brief 
(Addendum A to Defendant's brief) appears to be that judgment and is 
docketed as II Amended Minutes 2/2/15." Although unfortunately 
ambiguous, this document does not appear to be contemporaneous with the 
hearings and judgments at issue in this appeal. 
-9-
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the three relevant hearings is that no one involved - not the court~ the 
Defendant, defense counsel, or the prosecutor - thought that the court ever 
ordered concurrent sentences. Months after the fact, Defendant stumbled 
across a mistake in the record and now tries to cash it in for a sentence 
reduction. 
Utah law mandates that the court "shall state on the record and shall 
indicate in the order of judgment" whether the sentence is to run concurrent 
with or consecutive to any other sentences the defendant is serving. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (West 2015) (emphasis added). Failure to do so 
renders the resulting sentence illegal. Defendant does not dispute that no 
such statements were made at the February 2nd hearing. The ~entence 
imposed was there~ore illegal because it omitted a statutorily-required term. 
The statement in the February 3rd judgment regarding concurrent 
sentences was a clerical error because, as the court held, it did not reflect its 
intent at the February 2nd hearing. There was no statement at the hearing 
regarding concurrent sentences, no judicial intent to enter such an order, 
and the record as a whole shows that neither the parties nor the court 
believed the concurrent/ consecutive issue was resolved until the February 
10th hearing. Furthermore, the February 3rd judgment could not correct the 
illegal sentence even if it was not cleric~! error because the judgn1ent did not 
-10-
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supply the required "on the record" statement mandated by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(1). Therefore, the dish·ict court retained jurisdiction until it 
issued the February 12th judgment. 
The February 10, 2015 hearing and its resulting February 12, 2015 
judgment were the first time the court entered a valid sentence, thereby 
correcting the prior illegal sentence. 
This Court should affirm the district court's February 12, 2015 
judgment and sentence and its denial of Defendant's rule 22( e) motion. 
ARGUMENT 
]. 
-• 
THE FEBRUARY 3RD JUDGMENT DID NOT DIVEST THE 
COURT OF JURISDICTION TO CORRECT ITS ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE 
A. The February 2, 2015 sentence was illegal. 
"[D]eterminations of concurrent or consecutive sentencing are to be 
made at the time of final judgment." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, if 8, 203 P.3d 
984. "A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences" and "shall state on the Yf:COrd and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment" whether·· sentences are to be concurrent or 
consecutive with each other and."with any oth~r sentences the defendant is 
-11-
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already serving." 
( emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1)(a)-(b) (West 2015) 
This did not happen at the February 2, 2015 hearing. At that hearing 
the court made no determination on the record regarding concurrent or 
consecutive sentences. This fact alone makes the sentence illegal because it 
'" omits a term required to be imposed by statute."' Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,r13, 
(adopting definition of "illegal sentence" promulgated by United States v. 
Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also id. ,I16. "As a rule, 
illegal sentences are void and neither create rights nor impair or affect any 
rights." Id. at ~17 (citing State v. Babel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991)). When a 
sentence is illegal, "the jurisdiction of the district court continues until a 
valid sentence is imposed." Id. 
Much like Defendant here, Yazzie was on probation for two felonies 
when he was convicted of two n1ore felonies. Id. at ~,r2-3. The court 
sentenced him for the new felonies, suspended the sentence and imposed 
jail time and probation, but made no mention of whether t~e new sentences 
would be concurrent with or consecutive to the old ones. Id. ,I3. Yazzie 
later violated his probation and the judge in the second case imposed the 
suspended sentences and only then ord~red them to run consecutive to the 
sentences in Yazzie' s prior case. Id. at c;f 4. The Utah Supreme Court held 
-12-
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that the concurrent/ consecutive detennination was a statutorily-required 
term of the sentence and its omission left the original sentence incmnplete 
and therefore illegal. Id. at il 16. The Court then held that the later parole 
revocation and sentencing "in effect, corrected the illegally imposed 
sentence" by satisfying the statutory requirements, resulting in a valid 
sentence. Id. at il 17. The facts of this case are even stronger than Yazzie 
because here we have the district court's own factual findings about its lack 
of intent to impose concurrent sentences at the February 2nd hearing. (Add. 
G at 3.) Defendant neither discloses Yazzie nor confronts its reasoning and 
holding. 
Because the sentence imposed at the February 2, 2015 hearing omitted 
the same term at issue in Yazzie, the February 2nd sentence was illegal. The 
central question then becomes: When did the district court correct the illegal 
sentence and impose a valid one? Defendant argues that occurred the next 
day when the _court signed the written order that included Ia1:-guage about 
concurrent prison terms. (Br.Aplt. at 12.) But that language was clerical 
error and, even if it was not, it did not impose a valid sentence in any event. 
B. The court correctly held that the February 3rd judgment 
imposing concurrent sentences was clerical error. 
Rule 30(b) provides that "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or 
other parts of the record and errors in the record arising fr01n oversight or 
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omission may be corrected by the court at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(b). Hence, the existence of jurisdiction to amend the original sentencing 
order hinges on whether the district court was correcting a clerical error 
under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Rodrigues, 
2009 UT 62, ~13, 218 P.3d 610. 
A rule 30(b) analysis requires distinguishing between clerical and 
judicial errors. See id. at ~14. "' A clerical error is one made in recording a 
judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to 
the actual intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error. is one 
made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect 
judgment."' Id. ( quoting Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 
125, 130 (Utah 1989)). The appellate court '"look[s] to the record to 
harmonize the intent of the court with the written judgment" in order to 
determine whether the mistake is cleri':al. See id. ( quoting State v. Lorrah, 
761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988)). The inquiry does not turn on the identity 
of the one who made the error, but rather "whether the error 'is clearly a 
forrr:tal error that should be corrected in the interest of having [the] 
judgment, order, or other part of the record reflect what was done or 
intended."' Id. (quoting Bishop v. Gen.Tee, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ~30, 48 P.3d 218 
(additional quotations omitted)). In short, the Court looks at "(1) whether 
-14-
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·,"' 
the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or 
· intended, (2) whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and 
decision making, and (3) whether the error is clear from the record." Id. at 
,I14. 
Defendant's entire argument as to each of the three Rodrigues factors 
rests on the court's imposition of the suspended prison term. (Br.Aplt. at 
14-15.) But that singular fact is not logically related to the 
concurrent/ consecutive question and does not compel Defendant's 
conclusion. 
1. The district court did not intend to rule on concurrent or 
consecutive sentences at the February 2nd hearing. 
An error in the recording of a judgment is clerical when it results in 
"the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of 
the court."· Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, at ~15 ( quotation omitted). The parties' 
intent may be considered in the analysis, but_"it is ultimately the intent of 
the court or fact finder that is binding." Id. Efforts to correct a clerical error 
"
11nust be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of 
the court."' Id. (quoting Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401,402 (Utah 1984)). 
Defendant argues that 11 [b]ased on the nature [sic] and language 
utilized at sentencing, the trial judge intended to give Defendant the benefit 
of concurrent sentences." (Br.Aplt. 14.) He claims that the mere act of 
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imposing a suspended prison term, 365 days in jail, and probation reflects 
an intent to give concurrent sentences. Id. But that does not follow. Utah 
courts impose suspended sentences that run consecutive to prior sentences 
all the time - especially where a jail term and probation are imposed. It is 
just as likely that the court intended Defendant's suspended sentence, jail, 
and probation to begin after any previously imposed sentences expired. 
Not only are these terms not mutually exclusive with a consecutive 
sentence, they have no logical connection to one another. Defendant cites 
no cases for his proposition, nor does ~e point to any specific language in 
the transcript to support it - for the simple reason that the record of the 
February 2nd hearing is silent on the subject of concurrent or_ cons_ecutive 
sentences in violation of Utah Code A~ .. § 76-3-401(1)(a)-(b). 
The entire February 2nd transcript runs only three and a half pages 
and is subject to only a single interpretaHon: The district court - admittedly 
. ' \. . 
tired and "confused" at the hearing, (R 93) - did not give a moment of 
t~ought to the subject of concurrent or ,consecutive sentences. The bulk of 
the transcript concerns the plea colloquy. (R. 87-90.) The sentencing 
occupies only nine lines of text at the very end and reflects some internal 
confusion abou~ the hearing itself, with the judge saying" As you know, I 
sentenced you to 365 days in the county jail" when there was no mention of 
-16-
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any such thing prior to that. (R. 89-90.) Nothing in the transcript supports 
Defendant's reading. 
Rodrigues makes clear that the distinction between clerical and judicial 
error does not hinge on who makes ihe error - the judge or the clerk - but 
on whether the error is one that 1nust be corrected in order to have the 
judgment accurately reflect what the court intended. See Rodrigues, 2009 UT 
62, il14. The clerical error analysis looks at the intent of the district court, 
not the accuracy of the court clerk in recording the judgment announced by 
the court. See id. at ~14 & n.4. 
State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, 322 P.3d 1184, illustrates this point. 
There, the on-the-record statements . and the judgment both imposed 
concurrent sentences, yet both were ~ound to be clerical error. Id. at if if 14-
15. Perkins pled to two child abuse counts while on parole. The district 
. . 
court expressed_ outrage at Perkins' s history of _child abuse, stating "I quite 
franldy do~' t think you should ever .walk the streets again," yet moments 
later stated, 'Tm going to sentence you to two third degree felonies, zero to 
five years on each one to run concurrently with each other" and 
"concurrently" to the sentences Perkins was then serving. Id. at ,rs. The 
clerk issued a written judg~ent reci_ting concurrent sente~ces. Id. at 16. 
When the· mistake was pointed out, the court ruled the error was cl,erical 
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because the record reflected a clear intent to hnpose consecutive sentences, 
non:vithstanding the words spoken. Id. This Court affirmed, despite. 
un~mbiguous statements imposing concurrent sentences in both the ~eco_rd 
and judgment. Id. at if16. Thus, it did not matter that the clerk issued a 
written ruling that accurately reflected the words the judge spoke, because 
the words themselves were the clerical error. Judges and clerks can both 
make correctable clerical errors. 
Here, the facts are at least as strcng as Perkins. With a silent record, 
Defendant h·ies to take advantage of t~e court clerk mistakenly filling the 
hole in. the sentencing by including boilerplate language regarding 
concurrent sentences. But the fact that the court clerk later included the 
errant language in the February 3rd ju~gment is not itself evidence of the 
court's intent. The court's intent must be gleaned from the hearing and the 
surrounding facts. The hearing contains nothing but silence. And the 
surrounding facts suggest an understanding by all participants that no 
decision on concurrent or consecutive sentences was reached at the 
February 2nd hearing. As such, the February 3rd judgment does not reflect 
what was done or intended at the hearing. See Rodriques, 2009 UT 62, ,14. 
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2. The error was not a result of judicial reasoning or 
decision making and the error is clear from the record. 
Defendant makes the same flawed arguments for the second and 
third Rodrigues factors, asserting the same conditional syllogism: If a court 
imposes a suspended sentence, then it intends to impose concurrent prison 
terms. But the premise does not compel the conclusion. The court's 
reasoning ~ imposing a suspended sentence implies nothing about the 
judge's reasoning on when that sentence should begin in relation to other 
sentences. As discussed above, this record is quite clear that the judge did 
not engage in any "reasoning" _or thought of any kind regarding concurrent 
sentences at the February 2nd hearing. 
That the clerk later mistakenly included the language regarding 
concurrent sentences in the judgment does not retroactively create judicial 
reasoning where there was none. Indeed, at t~e February 3rd hearing the 
court heard argument from defense counsel regarding concurrent sentences, 
and then punted the issue. (R. 94-95.) After discussing sentencing generally 
with defense counsel, the court sai~, ~'Mr. Bushell, if you're going to request 
perhaps I consider something else, can we continue this a week so I can pull 
the pre-sentence report?" (R. 96.) pefense counsel agreed and the court 
. . . 
noted "I'd like to know a little bit more, and I'd like to pull the pre-sentence 
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report." (R. · 97.) The court then concluded, "Okay. We'll continue the 
sentencing one week, and we'll pull the pre-sentence report." Id. 
When the parties arrived at the February 10th hearing they spent 
approximately half of their time arguing the concurrent/ consecutive issue. 
(R. 100-102.) The court considered the arguments and statements from the 
Defendant, made factual findings, and imposed consecutive sentences, on 
the record, as required by Utah Code section 76-3-401(1)(a)-(b). Everything 
about this chain of events suggests that the court and the parties explicitly 
refrained from finally addressing the concurrent/ consecutive issue until the 
February 10th hearing, and that the February 3rd judgment was therefore 
clerical error. See Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ~14. 
It does not matter if the February 3rd order was sign~d before or after 
the February 3rd hearing; on this record, the order makes no sense either 
way. When Defendant argues that the February 3rd judgment reflects the 
court's intent at the February 2nd hearing he does not account for any 
events after the hearing. See Perkins, 2014 UT App 60 at ~15 ( discussing the 
ilnportance of_ the court's actions after the clerical error). He si~ply ignores 
them. However, if one views the February 3rd order as reflecting the 
court's intent from February 2nd, the later argu1nents of counsel and the 
' " 
considerations of the court become nonsensical. 
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The court's failure to correct defense counsel at the February 3rd 
h~aring when he begins asking for c?ncurrent sentences by informing him 
that the issue h~d already been d~cided can only be read as indicating that 
the court was not aware of the language in the February 3rd judgment. 
Even 1nore perverse would be the judge "pretending" to want to review the 
pre-sentence report and "know a little bit more" about an issue that he had 
secretly decided just before the hearing or, alternatively, going ahead and 
deciding immediately after the hearing despite his cutting off counsel on the 
issue and his ruling to continue the sentencing. Under Defendant's version 
of the facts, the February 10th hearing, complete with arguments of counsel 
directly on the topic and rulings by the court imposing consecutive instead 
of the previous concurrent sentences becomes little more than farce. 
No honest reading of the totality of this record supports Defendant's 
interpretation. The court wanted to kiiow more at the February 3rd hearing 
. . 
because it took the sentencing .issue seriously, wanted to get it right, and 
had not already decided the issue. By the February 10th hearing, the erroneous 
February 3rd judgment had been in the record (and presumably served on 
counsel) for approximately a week. This further indicates that none of the 
participants - especially the court . - had seen the language regarding 
concurrent sentences. Surely, if defense counsel thought the court had 
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already ruled in his favor he would have argued that at the February 10th 
hearing. The only judicial intent apparent from the record is the desire to 
. . 
review the p~e-senten.ce report and hear arg~ments from ~ounsel on 
whether the sentences should be concurrent or consecutive. The court's 
explicit, on-the-record statements are tJle best evidence of its intent, and 
against that evidence the February 3rd judgment looks groundless and 
erroneous. 
Indeed, without the February 3rd judgment, this record makes perfect 
sense, follows a very normal pattern fo~ sentencing, and is open to .only one 
realis_tic interpretation that accounts for all of the events. The language 
r~garding concurrent ~entences in the February 3rd judgment was nothing 
but a clerical mistake. 
This Court should affirm the dis~ict court's ruling that the February 
3rd judgment contained a clerical error and its orde_r striking language 
referring to concurrent sentences. And because this ruling was correct, the 
court retained jurisdiction until a valid sentence was entered. See Yazzie, 
2009 UT 14, if 17. 
C. Even if there was no clerical error, the February 3rd judgment 
. did not correct the prior illegal se.ntence. 
Defendant argues that when the district court signed the February 
3rd judgment containing the language regarding concurrent sentences it 
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immediately "lost subject matter jurisdiction over the case for the purposes 
: . 
o.f resentencing." (Br.Aplt. at 12.) He cites cases for the uncontroversial 
proposition that · a court loses subject matter jurisdiction once a valid 
sentence· is imposed. But he omits any discussion of how those cases 
compel the result he seeks. Defendant does not meet his burden of 
persuasion because he fails to offer reasoned argument from the authorities 
he relies on. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, if 39, 355 
P.3d 1031 (stating Utah appellate courts "require 'not just bald citation to 
authority but development of th_at authority and reasoned analysis based on 
t0at authority"') (citation omitted). 
In any _event, none of the cases Defendant cites merit any discussion 
because they are factu_ally inapposite and do not address the statute 
applicable here. Defendant merely asserts that as soon as the court supplied 
the term that was missing from the February 2nd hearing the sentence was 
complete and the court's jurisdiction evaporated, thereby voi~ing the 
February 10th hearing and February 12th judgment. (Br.Aplt. at 12-13.) But 
the applicable statute mandates that the court "shall state on the record and 
shall indicate in the order of judgmE-nt" whether the sentences it imposes 
"are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the 
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defendant is already serving." 
( emphasis added). 
Utah Code Am1. § 76-3-401(1) & (l)(b) 
"The pri1nary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 1 )4, 52 P.3d 1210. To discover that 
intent, the Court looks "first to the plain language of the statute." Id. The 
Court assumes "that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the 
statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable." Id. An interpretation that "would render portions 
of !he statute redundant, superfluous, and inoperable" is "impermissible 
under the plain language rule." Id. at ,r 35. 
Although the State is unaware of any cases interpreting "shall state 
on the record and shall indicate in the order of j.udgment" in section 76-3-
401 (1 ), the plain language indicates that, whatever a statement "on the 
record" is, it must be something other than a recitation of concurrent or 
consecutive sentences in the order of judgment. The statute plainly requires 
both. To interpret a recitation in the order of judgment as satisfying the" on 
the record" requirement renders the "on the record" language and the 
conjunctive "and" between the two terms wholly superfluous. Because 
courts '"interpret statutes to give meaning to all part~, and avoid rendering 
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portions of the statute superfluous'" the on the record requirement must be, 
at minimum, a statement by the court beyond that contained in the order of 
judgment. See State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, if23, 309 P.3d 209 (quoting 
Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2012 UT 91, ,r11, 293 P.3d 
369) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). No such statement exists 
on this record. 
This reading makes sense given the gravity of sentencing 
determinations. To avoid the very problem raised in this case, statements 
regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences must be made "on the 
record" and the terms recited in the order of judgment must accord with 
t}:tose on the record statements. In other words, the cou~~t cannot say one 
thing ( or, as in this case, nothing at all) on the record and then order 
something different in the written judgment. 
The 1nost natural meaning of "on the record" is the one used 
colloquially by lawyers and judges on a daily basis in courts across the 
country - meaning a statement in op~n court or_ in camera, recorded in some 
reliable fashion, that provides "an objective basis for review." State v. 
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, if 42, 137 ~.3d 716 ( quotation mnitted) (noting that, in 
the context of discussing waivers of the right to counsel, "we continue to 
strongly recommend a colloquy on the record"). 
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This is generally the meaning the Utah Supreme Court has used in 
related circumstances. When clarifying the requirements for accepting a 
plea under the precursor to current rule ll(e), Utah R. Crim. P., the Court 
noted that, even when using an affidavit to satisfy the statutory 
requirements "the trial judge should then review the statements in the 
affidavit with the defendant ... on th:e record before accepting the guilty 
plea." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, .1314 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added); 
accord State v. Gentry, 797 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the 
then-current version of the same rule and rejecting the "record as a whole" 
. approach to plea hearings, noting that Gibbons "clearly mandates that the 
trial court must conduct an on-the-record review with defendant."). The 
current version of rule ll(e) incorporates this language, stating that the 
required findings "may be based on .questioning the defendant on the 
r~cord." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
Similarly, w~en analyzing Utah Code section 77-18-1(6)(a), which 
requires courts t<:-1 resolve challenge? to inaccuracies in pre-sentence 
investigation reports "on the record," courts have remanded where 
objections to inaccuracies were not properly resolved in open court. See e.g., 
State v. l\lfaroney, 2004 UT App 206 ilif2?-29, 94 P.3d 295. Although, in the 
context of detailed factual findings, the Lltah Supreme Court has held that a 
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trial court II may hold an additional hearing if required by the circumstances, 
or siinply enter the necessary findings upon the record where the contest-ed 
issues were presented to the court and considered at the sentencing hearing," State 
I 
v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ~15, 6 P.3d 1133 (emphasis added), but the statute 
here contemplates both a written judgment and something more "on the 
record." 
In the context of a sentencing - which always involves a hearing - the 
more natural reading of Utah Code section 76-3-401(1) regarding the 
concurrent/consecutive determination is that "on the record" means a 
statement in open court recorded in a_ transcript, audio, video, or otherwise. 
But for purposes of this case, the Court need not determine the exact 
contours of an "on the record" statement under section 76-3-401(1). The 
Court need only determine that it means something more than the recitation 
in the order of judgment because here there is nothing more than the 
judgment (and the Court need only address this issue it finds that the 
language in the February 3rd judgme~tt was not clerical error). 
At the conclusion of the February 2nd hearing, the sentence was 
illegal because it lacked both of the statutory require1nents: there was no 
statement "on the record" and no indication "in the order of judgment" 
regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences. When the court signed the 
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February 3rd judgment, only half of the statutory criteria were then met. 
Merely indicating concurrent sentences in the order of judgment could not 
supply the necessary "on the record" statement as well, without rendering 
the on the record requirement superfluous. The statute is clear that these 
are two distinct requirements. 
Because the record in this case is devoid of any other statements 
regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences until the February 10th 
hearing, a valid sentence could not have been imposed until that date at the 
earliest. Therefore, the court was not diyested of jurisdiction when the court 
signed the February 3rd judgment. 
II. 
THE FEBRUARY 10, 2015 HEARING AND THE RESULTING 
FEBRUARY 12, 2015 JUDGMENT WAS. THE FIRST TIME 
THE COURT IMPOSED AV ALID SENTENCE 
The February 10, 2015 hearing, and the resulting February 12, 2015 
order of judgment, was the first time the court complied with Utah Code 
sections 76-3-L!Ol(l)(a) and (b). It was only then that "a valid sentence [was] 
imposed" as contemplated by Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,r17. That was the first 
time the court made consistent statements on the record and in the 
judgment regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences as mandated by 
Utah Code section 76-3-401(1). 
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Defendant's argument that the combination of the February 2, 2015 
hearing and February 3, 2015 order operated as a valid sentence that 
thereby removed the dish·ict court's jurisdiction to impose the subsequent 
sentence is meritless. Just as in Yazzie, the February 10th hearing and 
resulting judgment" in effect, corrected the illegally imposed sentence" even 
though the district court was not necessarily aware at the time that that was 
what it was doing. See Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, if 17. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on September 1, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Soli tor General 
Counsel for ppellee 
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76-3-401 Concurrent or consecutive sentences -- Limitations -- Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court 
shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other 
sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, 
\j character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is 
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court finds and states on 
the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from 
the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment 
stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode 
as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
!<I) (6) 
(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed 
may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6}(b ). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum 
~ sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his 
initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
i-iJ (b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to 
imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court 
or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present 
offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
4ii (8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive 
sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole 
shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is 
~ considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the 
aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other 
or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining 
~ imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive 
sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to 
limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
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(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive 
sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. t7> 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session 
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Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing 
sentence which shall be not less than 2 nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may 
continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present 
any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition 
of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be 
sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may 
be issued by the court. 
( c )(I) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a 
judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following 
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within 
which any appeal shall be filed. 
( c )(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code 
Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is 
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any fireaim or ammunition. The failure to advise does 
not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
( d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence. 
The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
( e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the comi shall impose sentence in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the 
Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann.§ 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in 
the sentencing order. 
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Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight 
or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
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Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing 
sentence which shall be not less than 2 nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the com1 may commit the defendant or may 
<iii continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present 
any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition 
vj of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be 
sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may 
be issued by the court. 
( c )( 1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a 
judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following 
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within 
which any appeal shall be filed. 
( c )(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code 
Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is 
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does 
not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
~ ( d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting fo1ih the sentence. 
The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a tme copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
( e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the 
Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77- 16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in 
the sentencing order. 
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Flt-~M 
2nd District - Farmingto 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UT 
~c; 15 2m1 
S~.COND 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JARED MICHAEL WATRING, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Bail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennifts 
Prosecutor: NELSON, JASON C 
Defendant 
OlSTR 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 101701211 FS 
Judge: JOHN R MORRIS 
Date: December 5, 2011 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SULLIVAN, KEVIN P 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 19, 1986 
Video 
Tape Number: 6-120511 Tape Count: 10:14-10:16 
CHARGES 
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd 
Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/11/2011 Guilty 
2. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd 
Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/11/2011 Guilty 
4. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/03/2011 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 101701211 Date: Dec 05, 2011 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 182 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 180 
day (s) . 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The defendant was sentenced on the Class B misdemeanor at an 
earlier date. Restitution will remain open. 
Charge# 1 
Charge# 2 
Charge# 4 Fine: $1295.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $627.47 
Due: $1295.00 
Total Fine: $1295.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $627.47 
Total Principal Due: $1295.00 
Plus Interest 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 101701211. 
The defendant is to pay $50.00 monthly on the 15th. 
The number of payments scheduled is 29 plus a final payment of 
$14.41. 
The first payment is due on 01/15/2012 the final payment of $14.41 
is due on 06/15/2014. The final payment may vary based on 
interest. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 2 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1295.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
OTHER: Defendant is to enter in and complete the Weber County Drug 
Court program. 
Page 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No: 101701211 Date: Dec 05, 2011 
OTHER: All other terms and conditions of 
full force and effect. 
Date: 
) 
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2nd District- Farmington 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JARED MICHAEL WATRING, 
Defendant. 
custody: Davis County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennaw 
Prosecutor: MAJOR, STEVEN V 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 19, 1986 
Audio 
MINUTES 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
Case No: 151700133 FS 
Judge: DAVID CONNORS 
Date: January 26, 2015 
Tape Number: FS-012615 Tape Count: 215-216 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
2. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
Defendant waives reading of Information. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant conditionally waives the preliminary hearing. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints RONALD S FUJINO to represent the 
defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: RONALD s FUJINO 
Address: 4764 S 900 E STE 2 
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Case No: 151700133 Date: Jan 26, 2015 
City: SALT LAKE CITY UT 84117 
Phone: (801) 268-6735 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. An Arraignment hearing has been set on 2/2/2015 at 9:00 AM in 
courtroom 6 before Judge JOHN R MORRIS. 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of the Davis County jail. 
Hold defendant pending further order. 
Date: 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
2nd District- Farmington 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. 
JARED MICHAEL WATRING, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Davis County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennifts 
Prosecutor: MAJOR, STEVEN V 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 19, 1986 
Video 
Tape_Number: CRT 6 Tape Count: 946-950 
CHARGES 
Case No: 151700133 FS 
Judge: 
Date: 
JOHN R MORRIS 
February 2, 2015 
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/2015 Guilty 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
Change of Plea Note 
The defendant will waive time and be sentenced today. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed 
five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) in the Davis 
County Jail. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
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Case No: 151700133 Date: Feb 02, 2015 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Fine payments are to be made to Adult Probation and Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law. 
OTHER: Enter into and complete RSAT. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/03/2015 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Courtroom 6 
Justice Complex 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Before Judge: JOHN' R MORRIS 
Date: 
Individuals needing special accommodations {including auxiliary communicative aids and 
services) should call Kim Sheffield at 801-447-3822 three days prior to the hearing. ~ 
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general information phone number 
is 801-447-3800. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
2nd District- Farmington 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
FIL 
FEB - ~ 2015 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
vs. 
JARED MICHAEL WATRING, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Davis County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennifts 
Prosecutor: MAJOR, STEVEN V 
Defendant 
Defend~nt's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 19, 1986 
Video 
Tape Number: CRT 6 Tape Count: 946-950 
CHARGES 
case No: 151700133 FS 
Judge: 
Date: 
JO!ffi R MORRIS 
February 2, 2015 
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - .3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/2015 Guilty 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
Change of Plea Note 
The defendant will waive time and be sentenced today. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed 
five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) in the Davis 
County Jail. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
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Case No: 151700133 Date: Feb 02, 2015 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
All cases and charges may run concurrent. 
Fine payments are to be made to Adult Probation and Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law. 
OTHER: Enter into and complete RSAT. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/03/2015 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Courtroom 6 
Justice Complex 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Before Judge: JOHN R MORRIS 
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District Court Juci~~-~--... . .... ...- ~-
~';;<' uz ·-···· -\\.' a ~ \''"''~"----Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and 
services) should call Kirn Sheffield at 801-447-3822 three days prior to the hearing. 
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general information phone number 
is 801-447-3800. 
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FIL D 
2nd District- Farmington 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I FEB 1 2 2015 
SECOND 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JARED MICHAEL WATRING, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Davis County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennifts 
Prosecutor: LARSEN, RICHARD L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BUSHELL, RYAN J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 19, 1986 
Video 
Tape Number: CRT 6 Tape Count: 245-251 
CHARGES 
MINUTES 
POST SENTENCING JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT 
Case No: 151700133 FS 
Judge: 
Date: 
JOHN R MORRIS 
February 10, 2015 
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/2015 Guilty 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT 
I 
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated in the Affidavit and 
Order to Show Cause: all 
The defendant's probation is revoked. 
The defendant is to serve the sentence as imposed in the original Sentence, Judgment 
and Commitment. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
This case will run consecutive to case# 101701211. The Court recommends the defendant 
enter the Conquest Program while in the Utah State Prison. 
ORIGINAL SENTENCE OF PRISON 
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Case No: 151700133 Date: Feb 10, 2015 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed ~ 
five years in the Utah State Prison. 
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FILED 
SEP 1~2015 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT OF DA 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE O-c::.--=U~::w::.----____. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JARED WATRING, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION 
TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
Case Nos. 101701211 
151700133 
Judge John R. Morris 
Defendant seeks correction of his sentences in Second District Court Case 
No. 101701211 and Second District Court Case No. 151700133. Defendant asserts that the 
Court sentenced him in Case No. 151700133 on February 2t 2015, ordering his sentence for 
the case to run concurrent with his sentence in Case No. 101701211. Defendant argues that 
the Court then imposed an illegal sentence on February l0t 2015t by ordering his sentence 
in Case No. 101701211 to run consecutive to his sentence in Case No. 151700133. The 
Court DENIES Defendant's motion. 
ANALYSIS 
"[An illegal sentence is] one which is ambiguous with respect to the time and man-
ner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be im-
posed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the 
judgment of conviction did not authorize." State v. Candedot 2010 UT 32, ,i 12, 232 P.3d 
1008 (internal quotations omitted). "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
The confusion relating to Defendant's sentences in these matters stems from two er-
rors that occurred on February 2, 2015. At Defendant's February 2, 2015 hearing, the Court 
accepted Defendant's guilty plea in Case No. 151700133 and proceeded with sentencing 
l.(w him on the charge. The sentence included an indeterminate prison term of 0 to 5 years that 
the Court suspended upon Defendant's successful completion of probation. Defendant's 
probation included supervised probation through Adult Probation and Parole for a period 
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Ruling and Order on Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence 
Case Nos. 101701211 & 151700133 
not to exceed 3 years and the requirement that Defendant enter and complete the Regional 
Substance Abuse Treatment program ("RSAT"). As part of the RSAT condition, the Court 
sentenced Defendant to a jail term o( 365 days. n_e Court then scheduled Defendant to ap-
pear on its RSAT calendar the next day, February 3, 2015. The Court, however, made no 
order as to whether Defendant's sentence would run concurrent with or consecutive to the 
sentence Defendant was already serving in Case No. 101701211. This omission constituted 
the imposition of an illegal sentence, as the Court was statutorily required to make its de-
termination as to concurrent or consecutive sentencing at the time of final judgment. See 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401(1); see also State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, 19,203 P.3d 984. 
The second error that occurred on February 2, 2015, was a clerical error in the re-
cording of the Minute Entry for the hearing. Despite the fact that the Court did not make a 
determination as to whether Defendant's sentence in Case No. 151700133 would run con-
current with or consecutive to Defendant's sentence in Case No. 101701211, the Court's 
Clerk mistakenly included language within the Minute Entry, which states: "All cases and 
charges may run concurrent." It was not the Court's intent to order Defendant's sentences 
to run concurrent and the Court was unaware that the Minute Entry included this language 
when it signed and entered the Minute Entry. The Court now corrects this clerical error by 
issuing an Amended Minute Entry for the February 2, 2015 hearing, which excises the im-
properly included language regarding concurrent sentencing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b ). 
When Defendant appeared on the Court's RSAT calendar on February 3, 2015, the 
Court aclmowledged and apologized for the confusion in the prior day's sentence. Defend-
ant's counsel also stated on the record that he and Defendant had discussed the sentencing 
issues with Defendant's two cases. Defendant then admitted to violating his probation in 
Case No. 101701211 and admitted that he is unable to complete ·the RSAT program in vio-
lation of the terms of his probation in Case No. 151700133. Defendant's counsel requested 
that the Court order Defendant's sentences in the cases to run concurrent. Rather than sen-
tencing Defendant on the probation violations at that time, the Court continued sentencing 
-2-
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Ruling and Order on Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence 
Case Nos. 101701211 & 151700133 
in the cases to February 10, 2015, so that it could review Defendant's Pre-Sentence Investi-
gation report ("PSI"). 
At the February 10, 2015 hearing, the Court revoked Defendant's probation in both 
cases and imposed the original prison sentences after reviewing Defendant's PSI and con-
sidering the arguments of counsel. The Court then corrected the illegal sentence imposed at 
the February 2, 2015 hearing by ordering Defendant's sentences for the cases to run consec-
utive. The Court's signed Minute Entries for the February 10, 2015 hearing accurately re-
flect the corrected sentences for Defendant's two cases. Accordingly, because the Court cor-
rected the illegal sentence imposed at the February 2, 2015 hearing when sentencing De-
fendant for his probation violations at the February 10, 2015 hearing, the Court finds that 
Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is moot. The Court, therefore, DENIES De-
fendant's motion and his Request for Hearing and Appointment of Counsel. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to 
Correct Illegal Sentence and Request for Hearing and Appointment of Counsel are 
DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the clerical error in the Minute Entry 
for Defendant's February 2, 2015 hearing be corrected by the issuance of an Amended Mi-
nute Entry. 
This Ruling and Order constitutes the Court's order on Defendant's motion; no sepa-
rate order need be prepared or submitted by the parties. 
Date signed: J {r \ f ( '-
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Ruling and Order on Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence 
Case Nos. 101701211 & 151700133 
CERTIFICATE OF MAJLING 
I hereby certify that on the \ 6l'V1 day of~ 2015, I sent a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Ruling and Order to the defendants as follows: 
Richard L. Larsen 
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
800 West State Street 
P.O.Box618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Jared Watring #200853 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P.O. Box250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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